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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, 
SUP. CT. NO. 19184 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
HEATHER S. AMICONE, 
Defendant/ 
Appellant. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In her opening brief, appellant challenged the mandatory 
minimum jail sentence of U.C.A. §76-10-1204(2) on four distinct 
grounds which, in abbreviated notation, are as follows: the 
First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, equal protection and 
separation of powers. While appellant continues to rely on all 
rour of these grounds, appellant's oral argument as well as 
this Reply Brief will focus exclusively on the first two of 
these grounds. 
THE MANDATORY MINIMUM J,\IL SEI~Tl::tJc,·E RE-
QUIRED BY U.C.A. §-6-10-1204121 ~IGLATES 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS APPLIED TO A F'IRST 
OFFENSE BY A NON-MANAGERIAL CLERK WHO SOLD 
TICKETS FOR THE EXHIBITION OF A FILM SUB-
SEQUENTLY DETERMINED TO BE OBSCENE. 
In support of their contention that the First Amendment is 
not violated by mandatory minimum Jail sentences for first time 
violators of a state's obscenity law, the State asserts the 
following arguments: 
1. The State implies that a defendant has the 
ability to know ahead of time whether or not particular 
material is obscene or constitutionally protected. 
(B.O.R .. !:./15.) 
2. The State asserts that once material is shown to 
be obscene, the State can punish the offense by whatever 
procedures and in whatever manner it sees fit. (B. 0. R. 
14-15.) 
3. The State asserts that Ms. Amicone's guilty plea 
"totally removed any 'dim and uncertain line' which may 
have existed as to the obscenity of the material." 
(B.O.R. 15.) 
1/ The designation "B.O.R." 
refer to specific page numbers 
filed by the State herein. 
shall 
from 
be 
the 
used here1na:ter to 
Brief o: Pespondent 
"1. The State asserts that the lack of judicial pre-
cedent on the narrow issue raised herein demonstrates that 
appellant's contention is without merit. (B.O.R. 16.) 
5. The State asserts that Utah's mandatory sen-
tencing law has had and will have no chilling effect on 
protected expression. (B.O.R. 16-17.) 
As will be demonstrated below none of these assertions has 
merit. 
The State sophistically asserts that the Supreme Court's 
upholding of obscenity legislation against vagueness challenges 
is dispositive of the question of whether or not any layman can 
determine in advance whether or not particular material is 
obscene or constitutionally protected. (See B. O. R. at 15. ) 
The absurdity of this contention is thoroughly demonstrated by 
the cases cited in Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 12, where 
films as "tame" as "Carnal Knowledge" are found obscene by some 
courts while films as explicit as "Deep Throat" are found not 
obscene by other courts. Indeed, in two of the cases cited in 
Appellant's Opening Brief, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the 5th Circuit and the Louisiana Supreme Court, applying 
identical legal approaches, differed in their conclusions as to 
whether or not Penthouse Magazine is constitutionally protected 
as a matter of law. Perhaps the most realistic appraisal of 
the inability of any individual to know ahead of time whether 
or not a particular work is obscene or not was given by the en 
bane 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in Universal Amusement Co., 
Inc. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. en bane 1978); aff'd. on 
-3-
other grounds, 445 U.S. 308, 100 S.Ct. 1156 119801. In that-
case, the majority of the en bane 5th Circuit held unconst1tu-
tional a Texas statute which authorized the issuance of a 
prospective injunction against exhibition of unnamed "obscene" 
films upon proof that an individual had exhibited obscene films 
in the past. In striking down the statutory provision 
authorizing such an injunction, the Court stated: 
"Incorporation of the statutory definition of 
obscenity usually a listing of forbidden 
sexual acts or acrobatics - merely begs the 
question, for few of us have the omniscience 
to determine, in advance of a final judicial 
ruling, whether a film is legally obscene. 
Moreover, it is possible that a film con-
taining many of the acts listed in the statute 
may eventually be held not to be obscene, 
since the work must be ~ken as a whole, 
Miller v. California, supra, and since State 
law cannot define the 'contemporary community 
standards' that must be applied by the fact 
finder. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 
97 Sup.Ct. 1756 (1977). [Some emphasis added, 
some in original] 587 F.2d at 169. 
Although the Supreme Court has upheld obscenity legisla-
tion by a narrow 5-4 margin against constitutional challenges 
based upon vagueness, that court has never presumed that 
obscenity can be determined by anyone prior to a final judicial 
determination. Indeed, as mentioned in footnote 3 of Appe 1-
lant's Opening Brief (at p. 10) the Supreme Court has held that 
police officers lack the ability to determine what is or is not 
obscene, and, as a result, they are prohibited from even makinq 
probable cause determinations of obscenity for purposes ot 
seizing allegedly obscene materials. 
Because of the undeniable inability of ~ to know in 
-4-
Jd',ance whether particular material will be found obscene or 
,rnst1tutionall'1 protected, it is crucial in order to prevent 
rn undue chilling of protected speech that sentencing judges 
retain discretion to weigh the degree of any defendant's cul-
pability when sentencing that defendant. Certainly where, as 
here, there is no evidence that the defendant ever actually saw 
the film in question and there is no evidence that the defen-
dant had any financial interest in the business other than her 
presumed hourly wages as a non-managerial clerk, a 7 day manda-
tory Jail sentence 
this Court, will 
is not only uncalled for, but, if upheld by 
have a stifling self-censorship effect 
throughout the state. 
The State has also asserted that once a court finds parti-
cular material to be obscene, there are no applicable safe-
guards to prevent punishment in whatever degree and whatever 
manner the State sees fit. (See B.O.R. 14-15.) Although the 
constitutionality of mandatory minimum jail sentences for first 
time obscenity violators is an issue of first impression, the 
State's position has been rejected in a very analogous context 
by nearly every court to have considered it. Specifically, 
numerous states, acting pursuant to the assumption posed by the 
State herein, have passed laws authorizing either the pad-
locking of a theater or bookstore or the revocation of its 
b11siness license 
conviction. As 
upon proof of a prior obscenity violation or 
noted by Chief Judge Aldon J. Anderson in 
Cornflower Entertainment, Inc. v. Salt Lake City, 485 F.Supp. 
ID. Utah 1980), the few courts which have upheld these laws 
-5-
did so based upon the reasoning that "the ~hutdl)Wn was 
penalty for past abuses and therefore did not <:onstl tute cl 
prior restraint." 485 F.Supp. at 786. However, as noted by 
Judge Anderson, the vast maJority of courts have adopted the 
better reasoned rule which recognizes that conviction for an 
obscenity violation does not give a state cart blanche to 
punish the offense in any manner and by whatever procedures it 
desires. [A list of the numerous cases striking such 
padlocking and license revocation laws as unconstitutional is 
set forth in the margin. l/l 
ll The following cases have found nuisance laws 
unconstitutional which provide for the padlocking of businesses 
where obscenity offenses have occurred in the past: Universal 
Amusement Co., Inc. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 164-166 (5th Cir. 
en bane 1978) [as to this particular point, all 14 judges of 
the en bane court were in agreement], aff'd. on other grounds, 
445 U.S. 308, 100 S.Ct. 1156 (1980); Pe"OPle ex rel Busch v. 
Proaection Room Theater, 17 C.3d 42, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 550 
P.2 600 (1976), cert. den. 429 U.S. 922, 97 S.Ct. 320 (1976); 
General Corp. v. Sweeton, 320 So.2d 668 (Ala. 1975), cert. den. 
425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1494 (1976); Kansas v. Motion Picture 
Entitled "The Bet", 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d 760 (1976); Gulf 
States Theaters of Louisiana v. Richardson, 287 So.2d ~ 
(La. 1974); New Riveria Arts Theatre v. Davis, 219 Tenn. 652, 
412 S.W.2d 890 (1967); Society to Oppose Pornography, Inc. v. 
Thevis, 255 So.2d 876 (La.App. 1972); Giarrusso v. D'Iberville 
GaIIe"ry, 295 So.2d 891 (La.App. 1974); State ex rel Blee v. 
Mohney Enterprises, 289 N.E.2d 519 (Ind.App.1973); Sanders v. 
State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974); State ex rel Field 
v:-Hess, 540 P. 2d 1165 (Okla. 1975); Commonwealth ex rel Davis 
v. Van Emberg, 347 A. 2d 712 (Penn. 1975); City of Minot v. 
Central Ave. News, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1981); Parish of 
Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc. 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977), 
overruling La.App., 341 So.2d 23; Mitchem v. State ex rel 
Schaub, 250 So.2d 883 (Fla.1971). See also Nihiser v. Sendak, 
~Supp. 482 (N.D.Ind.1974), vacated--an2i remanded, 423 U.S. 
976, 96 S.Ct. 378 (1975), order re-entered August 16, 1976 
(unpub.), aff'd 431 U.S. 961, 97 S.Ct. 914 (1977); Huffman v. 
Pursue, Ltc:r;-420 U.S. 592, 612, n.23, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1212, n.23 
(1975); £.!_. Speight v. Slaton, 415 U.S. 333, 94 S.Ct. 1098 
(1974); State ex rel Ewing v. "Without a Stitch", 307 N.E.2d 
-6-
The Luses cited in the margin clearly reject the State's 
J~sertion that First Amendment protections become inapplicable 
once material is proven obscene. Indeed, as articulated by the 
Florida Supreme Court in Mitchem v. State ex rel Schaub, 250 
So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1971), supra, both the operation and the effect 
of statutes regulating obscenity must be carefully scrutinized 
to insure against undue chilling of protected expression. 
I I 
II 
II 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
911 (Ohio 1974). 
The following cases have held unconstitutional laws which 
allow a perrni t to be either revoked or denied upon a prior 
obscenity violation: Entertainment Concepts Inc. III v. 
Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 506 (7th Cir. 1980); Genusa v. City 
of Peoria, 475 F. Supp. 1199, 1207-09 (C.D.Ill. 1979), aff'd 
619 F.2d 1203, 1217-1220 (7th Cir. 1980); Cornflower Entertain-
rnent, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 485 F.Supp. 777 (D.Utah 
1980); Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 470 F.Supp. 1140 
(M.D.Fla. 1979); San Juan Liquors v. Consol. City of Jackson-
ville, 480 F.Supp. 151 (M.D.Fla. 1979); Natco Theatres Inc., v. 
Ratner, 463 F.Supp. 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Yuclan Enterprises 
Inc. v. Arre, 488 F.Supp. 820 (D.Hawaii 1980); Avon 42nd Street 
Corp. v. Myerson, 352 F.Supp. 994(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Oregon 
Bookmark Corp. v. Schrunk, 321 F.Supp. 639 (D.Oregon 1970); 
Perrine v. Municipal Court, 5 C.3d 656, 97 Cal.Rptr. 320, 488 
P.2d 648 (1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 1038, 92 S.Ct. 710 (1972); 
Kuhns v. Santa Cruz Co. Bd. of Sup'rs., 128 Cal.App.3d 369, 
374-375, 181 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3-4 (1982); City of Seattle v. 
Bittner, 81 Wash.2d 747, 505 P.2d 126 (1973); Alexander v. City 
of St. Paul, 303 Minn. 201, 227 N.W.2d. 370 (Minn.1975); City 
of Delevan v. Thomas, 31 Ill.App.3d 630, 334 N.E.2d 190 (1975); 
Harnar Theatres Inc. v. City of Newark, 150 N.J.Super. 14, 374 
A.2d 502 (1977); People v. J.W. Productions, 413 N.Y.S.2d 552 
IN.Y.C.Cr.Ct. 1979); cf. Marks v. City of Newport Ky., 344 
F.Supp. 675 (E.D.Ky.1972); Chulchian v. City of Indianapolis, 
477 F.Supp. 128, 131-132 (S.D.Ind. 1979), aff'd., 633 F.2d 27, 
30 (7th Cir. 1980). 
-7-
"The 14th Amendment of the United States 
Constitution requires that regu lat 1 nn of 
obscenity conform to procedures that will 
insure against the curtailment of cons ti tu-
tionally protected expression or publication. 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 
83 s.ct. 631 (1963). The operation and effect 
of the method by which sale of publications is 
to be restrained must be very carefully 
defined. Cf. Seeiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 
513, 78 S.Ct. 1332 (1958) Mitchem v. State 
ex rel Schaub, supra, 250 So. 2d at 886. 
As demonstrated by the extensive authority cited above and 
in Appellant's Opening Brief, the First Amendment does indeed 
restrict the power of the State to impose punishment even after 
a judicial determination of obscenity has taken place. 
At B.O.R. 15, the State asserts that Ms. Amicone's guilty 
plea "totally removed any 'dim and uncertain line' which may 
have existed as to the obscenity of the material." This 
statement evidences a total misunderstanding of the First 
Amendment principles applicable to this case. As both this 
Court and the Supreme Court have frequently held, it is not a 
required element in an obscenity prosecution to prove that the 
defendant actually knew that the material in question was 
legally obscene. A mere "awareness of the character of 
material" will suffice under the Utah statute. [U.C.A. 
§76-10-1201 (4).] Indeed, under the code section just 
described, even proof of a "constructive knowledge" of the 
character of the material will suffice to support a conviction. 
In short, Utah law carries no requirement of t=-roo f that the 
defendant has ever even seen the material in question. Accord-
ingly, absolutely nothing can be inferred about the defendant's 
-8-
m~ntal state vis-a-vis this offense from the mere fact that she 
··ntceretl a plea of guilty. }._! 
More importantly, even if this Court were to adopt the 
State's suggestion and construe the appellant's guilty plea as 
a belief on her part that the film in this case was obscene, 
such a belief could and would be nothing other than guesswork 
because, as noted by the Supreme Court in Roaden v. Kentucky, 
413 U.S. 496, 93 S.Ct. 2796 (1973) and Lee Art Theatre v. 
Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 88 S.Ct. 2103 (1968), and by the en 
bane 5th Circuit in Vance, supra, it is impossible for any 
individual to know in advance whether particular material is 
legally obscene or constitutionally protected prior to a 
Judicial determination. 
The State has also asserted that the lack of judicial 
precedent on the narrow issue raised herein demonstrates that 
appellant's contention is without merit. (See B.O.R. 16.) 
This assertion again is without merit. By the State's own 
admission, there is only one other state in the Union besides 
Utah which has a mandatory minimum Jail sentence for first-time 
obscenity violators (e.g. Tennessee). The mere fact that there 
has been no Tennessee or Utah case where this issue was pre-
sented is simply no indication whatsoever of the strength or 
weakness of this appeal. 
JI 
Moreover, as this Court is no doubt aware, guilty pleas 
frequently represent compromises wherein a defendant may give 
up certain potential defenses for any of a number of reasons 
not in the record. 
-9-
the t _1· 
sentencing law has had a:-,--: 
protected express:J~. (See ::3., . I 
contradicted not onl~: b·· tht=> ~t.J.tc: Is rJwr. '2X<.JP1pl 1-::.·s Gut 3lSl~ 
the Judgment of courts in analogous cases. 
First of all, the State mistakenl;· indicates that James 
Piepenburg, the defendant in State v. Piepenburg, 602 P.2d ~02 
(Utah 1979) was the president and a director of the corpora-
tion which operated the Studio Theatre, the theatre where 
Ms. Amicone was employed in the present case. (See B.O.R. 
16-17.) In fact, Mr. Piepenburg was the president and director 
of the corporation which operated the Gallery Theatre in Salt 
Lake City and not the Studio Theatre. Al though the State's 
error was no doubt unintentional, it is extremely revealing. 
Following Mr. Piepenburg's conviction and sentence to jail, the 
Gallery Theatre permanently closed down as a direct consequence 
of Mr. Piepenburg's Jail sentence! 
In addition to Mr. Piepenburg's example, the State has 
gone outside the record and asserted that four other cases 
resulted in convictions at the Studio Theatre. The State then 
argues that the fact that the theatre is still open for 
business is "proof" that the minimum mandator;· seven day Jail 
sentence has ~o ch~lling impact on the exercise of First i\rnend-
ment rights. 
merit. 
_'it· ,._ t~lfkd to emplo;·ment at the Studio Theatre after 
t:-,c·1r sPr.tences. Furthermore, with the possible excep-
~lr. Ta lor who was a manager at the theatre, all the 
1 !'er con•:ictcd defendants had ::;uit their ]Obs even prier to 
che1r sentencing . Presumably, the filing of criminal charges 
. 1ua1nst those defendants made them aware of the existence of 
Utah's mandatory sentencing requirement and pla1·ed a subs tan-
t1al, if not controlling, role in their decisions to terminate 
their employment prior to sentencing. 4 I Whether or not the 
Studio Theatre can continue to show films, these convicted 
defendants were sufficiently deterred from any further exhibi-
tions of constitutionally protected films. 
Second, it is not clear from the State's brief which, if 
any, of the cases there cited involved the sort of facts where, 
but for the statutory seven day sentence, the defendant would 
have received no Jail time at all. 
Third, it is reasonable to expect that the chilling effect 
upon an hourly wage non-managerial clerk would be substantially 
sreater than that on a manager who, because he has a greater 
stake in the success of the venture, is willing to take greater 
risks. 
Fourth, no published opinion in this state has yet upheld 
mandatory minimum sentence a constitutional 
:d l lenge. It is ::;uite possible that theatre employees could 
r~esumabl· the defendants were also deterred by the risk 
:i mar.C:C1tor'.· 30 da:/ sentence for a second conviction (as 
;ua>od ei~- r~.c .. C5-6-10-1204(3))! 
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have been advised that this statutory mandatory minimum had not 
yet been tested in court and may not be enforceable. Certain-
ly, the chilling effect of this provision will be much greater 
if this Court were to affirmatively endorse it. 
Finally, as the State's example of the Gallery Theatre's 
Mr. Piepenburg aptly demonstrates, Jail sentences do have an 
undeniable chilling impact upon the ability of a theatre to 
remain open. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any other reason 
why the Legislature might have passed such a law if it did not 
intend to bring about such a result. While the convictions of 
Studio Theatre employees have, thus far, deterred only those 
employees, and not the theatre itself, from continuing to show 
constitutionally protected films, an affirmance from this Court 
of mandatory minimum sentences upon first time non-managerial 
violators will undoubtedly heighten the chilling impact of the 
obscenity laws upon protected expression. If this Court 
upholds this mandatory minimum jail requirement, it is res-
pectfully submitted that no theatre in Utah would be able to 
find the clerical employees necessary to allow it to continue 
to display constitutionally protected adult films to consenting 
adult audiences. 
The State's assertion that its mandatory minimum jail sen-
tence for first time offenders has no chilling effect is also 
refuted by the decisions of courts faced with analogous statu-
tory provisions. In Universal Amusement Co., Inc. v. Vance, 
supra, 587 F.2d 159, 166 (5th Cir. en bane 1978), the en bane 
5th Circuit struck down two obscenity-nuisance provisions of 
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Lhc State ot Texas. The first of these laws allowed the place-
11<'r1t of a padlock for one year upon the doors of any business 
which had been convicted of an obscenity violation. The por-
t1on of the Vance opinion striking this padlocking law demon-
strated that the First Amendment does indeed limit the extent 
of punishment which can be imposed on one convicted of an 
obscenity violation. 
However, the second portion of the Vance opinion is even 
more analogous to the present case. In that portion, the court 
held unconstitutional a statutory provision which allowed a 
court to impose an injunction against future unnamed obscene 
films where the defendant was found to have shown any obscene 
films in the past. The court's rationale for striking down 
this form of punishment for past violations of the obscenity 
law is directly apposite to the issue presented herein. 
Specifically, the court found that the chilling effect of an 
injunction against future unnamed obscene films was an 
impermissible punishment for past violations of the obscenity 
law because it would encourage "a theatre operator to steer 
wide of the danger zone by avoiding borderline films that are 
nonetheless protected under the first amendment." 587 F.2d at 
166. As the court went on to note: 
"The line between obscenity and protected 
speech is 'dim and uncertain' Bantam Books, 
Inc. v. Sullivan, supra, 372 U.S. at 66, 83 
S.Ct. 631, and difficulty in locating that 
line leads to self-censorship, a particularly 
subtle and most insidious form of the malady." 
587 F.2d at 166. 
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In conclusion, appellant respectfully asserts that while 3 
seven day sentence may not seem severe when compared to the 
otherwise permissible maximum statutory sentences, lS 
extremely severe when it is made mandatory punishment for every 
first time non-managerial clerk whose only crime is having sold 
a ticket to a film that they probably have never even seen. 21 
If this law is upheld by the Court, it will no doubt be a short 
period of time before the pall of fear and timidity which 
closed the Gallery Theatre causes the same result at every 
other theatre in the State of Utah which attempts to exhibit 
constitutionally protected adult films to consenting adult 
audiences. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
21 Due to the provisions of U.C.A. §76-10-1201141 defining 
constructive and actual knowledge, it is not necessary for the 
State to even prove that the defendant has actually seen the 
film in question. Furthermore, in most cases there 1;ould seem 
to be no reason why the ticket seller would ever leave her 
booth to view the films inside the theatre. 
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II 
THE STATE HAS FAILED TO JUSTIFY THE MANDA-
TORY JAIL SENTENCE OF U.C.A. §76-10-1204(2) 
UNDER THE PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS REQUIRED 
BY SOLEM v. HELM, 103 S.CT. 3001 (1983). 
A. The State Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Offense Is Of 
Sufficient Gravity To Warrant The Harshness Of A Mandatory 
Seven Day Jail Sentence For All First Time Violators. 
In addressing the first of the three prongs of the propor-
tionality analysis required by Solem v. Helm, 103 S.Ct. 3001 
(1983), the State relies primarily on the decision of an Okla-
homa appellate court rendered in Hunt v. State, 601 P.2d 464 
(Okla. Cr. 1979). Not only did the Hunt case not involve a 
statutorily required minimum sentence, but the very language 
from the opinion which the State chose to quote indicates that 
the Oklahoma court's holding is entirely inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Solem, supra. Specifically, 
the State quotes from that portion of the Hunt opinion which 
states: 
"While these data do indicate that Oklahoma's 
obscenity laws are severe, this is the sort of 
argument one would make to the Legislature in 
seeking to have the law changed, rather than 
to this Court in seeking to have a conviction 
under the law voided. Severe is not cruel. 
To constitute cruel and unusual punishment, a 
penalty must serve no valid legislative 
purpose." Hunt v. State, 601 P.2d at 467. 
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The language above, upon which the State relies, is 
utterly inconsistent with, and has been oJverruled b~' tiw 
opinion of the Supreme Court in Solem v. 
the Hunt Court concedes that Oklahoma's 
Helm, supra. While 
obscenity laws are 
"severe", it concludes that severity is not a proper argument 
to be made to a court under the 8th Amendment but, instead, is 
strictly an argument that should be made to a legislature. The 
Supreme Court in Solem expressly made an analysis of the 
severity of the punishment a central element, indeed the first 
element, of its three part proportionality analysis. It is 
astonishing that the State would place its primary reliance 
upon a case that has been so thoroughly repudiated by 
controlling Supreme Court case law. 
Second, the Hunt opinion expressly concedes that Okla-
homa's obscenity laws are severe, yet even those laws do not 
require a minimum mandatory jail sentence for first time 
offenders, whereas Utah's obscenity laws do. 
The State next argues that both the United States Supreme 
Court and the State Legislature have determined that obscenity 
laws are necessary for the protection of "serious" state inter-
ests. (B.O.R. at 12.) In support of this assertion, the State 
refers this Court to the Supreme Court's opinion in Paris Adult 
Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628 11973) and U.C.A 
§76-10-1208(2) Neither of these references supports the con-
clusion that obscenity is a particularly serious crime. 
The language quoted from Paris (see B.O.R. at 18) says nothing 
more than that the states have a legitimate interest in 
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']'llat1ny ,)bscenitJ and does not even purport to suggest that, 
scheme of things, an obscenity violation is a 
it1cularly serious offense. Indeed, further on in its 
~inicrn in Paris, supra, the Supreme Court suggested that the 
optimal treatment of obscenity might be not to punish it as a 
•crime unless, prior to the exhibition of the film there had 
been a prior civil Judicial determination of the obscenity of 
that film. The Court's comments on such a procedure are set 
forth below: 
" [ S) uch a procedure provides 
purveyor of materials the 
notice, prior to any criminal 
to whether the materials are 
the First Amendment *" 
93 S.Ct. at 2634. 
an exhibitor or 
best possible 
indictments, as 
unprotected by 
413 U.S. at 55, 
"* This procedure would have even more 
merit if the exhibitor or purveyor could 
also test the issue of obscenity in a 
similar civil action, prior to any 
exposure to criminal penalty." Id., n.4. 
Obviously, the language above indicates that while the Supreme 
Court concedes that states may have a "legitimate" interest in 
regulating obscenity, it is certainly not considered by the 
Court to be a particularly serious offense. 
Not only did the Supreme Court in Paris fail to treat 
obscenity as a particularly serious crime, in Solem v. Helm, 
suEra, it expressly made clear that, for 8th Amendment pur-
'•JS<2s, "nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked 
L violence or the threat of violence". 103 S.Ct. at 3011. 
Similarly, the mere fact that the Legislature has not 
c~c:inted ticket takers an exemption from obscenity laws, (as 
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evidenced by the provisions of U.C.A. §~o-lrJ-12081:'.I, suprnl, 
is no indication whatsoever that the Legisl~ture considered "' 
obscenity violation by a ticket taker to be a particularl 1 
serious offense. 
Finally, in an attempt to persuade this Court that 
appellant herein has indeed committed a serious offense, the 
State asserts (at B.O.R. 12) that the appellant had "knowledge 
of what the film contained". However, as pointed out 
previously, the constructive knowledge provisions of Utah's 
obscenity law do not require that a defendant had ever viewed a 
film he or she was alleged to have exhibited. Furthermore, 
even if the defendant had in fact viewed the entire film, (and 
there is, of course, no evidence of this) the case law 
previously cited herein uniformly recognizes the undeniable 
fact that no one can know with any certainty whether or not a 
particular film is 
which applies the 
obscene prior to a judicial determination 
ever varying concept of contemporary com-
munity standards of tolerance. In sum, the State's assertions 
have utterly failed to establish that this offense was one of 
particular gravity. 
B. The State Has Virtually Conceded That It Punishes 
Obscenity Violations Far More Severely Than Anv Other 
Offenses Of Comparable Gravity. 
In Appellant's Opening Brief, she pointed out that, at the 
time the offense herein was committed, there were no other man-
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'ol<_•r'' Jail sentences in the Utah Criminal Code (U.C.A. Title 
,, I , even for felony offenders, unless the offense was a 
-ap1 tal offense. (A.O.B. at 19.) The State has not disputed 
Appellant further pointed out that, although some manda-
tory sentences have recently been added to the Criminal Code, 
these sentences apply exclusively to various felonies and not 
to misdemeanors. The State has not challenged that statement 
in any way except to point out that mandatory sentences have 
been added for three other obscenity-related offenses. (See 
B.O.R. at 12-13.) Accordingly, the State concedes that no mis-
demeanors in the Criminal Code other than obscenity-related 
offenses are punished with mandatory minimum jail sentences. 
This concession is dispositive of the second prong of the pro-
portionality analysis required by Solem, supra. 
Not only does the Utah Legislature fail to require minimum 
mandatory Jail sentences for other misdemeanor offenses, the 
sentences actually imposed by the District Court in the two 
week period contemporaneous with the date of appellant's sen-
tencing indicate that persons convicted of much more serious 
offenses were frequently given sentences which were fully sus-
pended. I See list attached as Exhibit "A". .§_/] This disparate 
6; 
Although this material is, admittedly, not in the record, 
the State cannot object to it on that ground because the State 
lat p. 17 of its Brief) discussed the circumstances of numerous 
cases involving employees of the Studio Theatre which were also 
not in the record. Moreover, all the sentencings shown in 
Exhibit "A" herein are a matter of public record. 
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treatment provides further evidence of the imperm1ss1b1lity of 
this mandatory sentence when measured under the second prony 
of the Solem test. 
C. The State 1 s OWn Evidence Clearly Establishes That, With 
But One Exception, Utah Is The Only State In The Union To 
Require Mandatory Minimum Jail Sentences For First Time 
Obscenity Violators. 
In appellant's opening brief, appellant's counsel pointed 
out that they were unaware of mandatory jail sentence require-
ments for first-time obscenity violators in any other jurisdic-
tions and that if such existed, they would be in the extreme 
minority of jurisdictions. (Brief of Appellant at 20.) The 
State has obviously conceded the truth of this position because 
it could find only one state, i.e. Tennessee, which, like Utah, 
has a mandatory minimum jail sentence for first time obscenity 
violators. 
The fact that only two states out of fifty have mandatory 
minimum jail sentences for first-time obscenity violators is 
damning evidence of the disproportionate nature of this statu-
tory punishment. 
D. Summary. 
In the present case, all three of the indicia for dispro-
portionate punishments articulated in Solem v. 
present. Moreover, the punishment in the present case not only 
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fultills all three elements of the Solem proportionality test, 
J,ut it also is clearly among the type of punishments which the 
~th rl!nendment was designed to prevent. Following its arti-
,culation of the three factors discussed herein, the Supreme 
Court in Solem advised courts that in applying these tests, 
they should make " [ c] omparisons of the harm caused or 
threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the 
offender". 103 S.Ct. at 3011. 
In the present case, the defendant is convicted of a crime 
without a specific victim, and, since films at the Studio 
Theatre are shown only to consenting adult audiences, the 
offense must be considered at the very low end of offenses 
harmful to society. Furthermore, because of the inability of 
anyone to know in advance whether or not a particular film is 
legally obscene, and because the appellant was a non-managerial 
ticket seller who had no reason to even view the film in 
question (and there is no evidence that she ever did) , the 
degree of her culpability must be at the very lowest level for 
any crime in the Criminal Code. Additionally, where 48 other 
states do not consider this offense serious enough to require 
mandatory minimum jail sentences for first-time offenders, and 
where Utah itself does not require mandatory minimum jail 
sentences for any other misdemeanor crimes which are not 
obscenity-related, it can only be concluded that the punishment 
inflicted upon appellant is disproportionate in violation of 
the 8th and 14th rl!nendments' prohibition against disproportion-
ate punishment as articulated in Solem, supra. 
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CONCLUSiut: 
For all the reasons stated above, this case should be 
remanded to the Circuit Court so that that Court can resentence 
Ms. Amicone based upon the true degree of her culpability as 
found by the trial court, free of the mandatory sentencing re-
quirement of U.C.A. §76-10-1204 (2). 
DATED: November 9, 1983 Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. WESTON 
G. RANDALL GARROU 
BROWN, WESTON & SARNO 
JEROME H. MOONEY 
By~~~...( 
G. RANDALL GARROU 
Attorneys for Appellant 
EXHIBIT "A" 
r 1~11'!F IJ "1()()NEY 
)~tober 20, 1983 
Randy Garrou 
BROWN, WESTON & SARNO 
433 North Camden Drive 
Suite 900 
iV!OONEY & SMITH 
".TTORNEYS AT LAW 
.368 SOUTH .'.JOO EAST 
SALT UIKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
80 l .'.364-6636 
Beverly Hills, California 90210 
Deat: Randy: 
STEPHEN R. SMITH. JR. 
Please find enclosed a recap of the sentencings that took place 
in the District Court for one week in each direction of Heather 
Amicone. District Court sentencings were chosen as opposed to 
Cit:cuit Court sentencings because records are available in one 
location according to dates, which is not the case in the Circuit 
Court. Also the offenses are of a more serious character and 
thus, give a better picture of evenhandedness. Unfortunately, we 
have no way of confirming whether a prior record existed in those 
cases where rap sheets were not available in the file. It is 
likely that the majority of those cases involved no prior 
t:ecords. I hope this is of some assistance. 
Thank you, 
-;~;!rn7:1 Mooney 
JHM: lah l 
Enclosure 
'1·'.\·11 
, . .Id r J 
JFFEt1SE SENTENCE 
81-226 Attempted dist of probation 
controlled subs. 
1··»ar·j P. ?RI·:E 82-353 Burglary Probation, 
serve 6 mo. 
RECORD* 
Misd's 
(note: Price was a 19 year old transient with no 
employment or residence.) 
~e1th R. MILLI~ER 82-877 DUI (Misd) 17 days Misd's 
Michael R. GARCIA 82-925 Att Ag Assault Probation 
Lamar SMITH 82-750 Unlawful Sexual Probation, 
Intercourse serve 6 mo. 
(note:Psych eval indicated that Smith was engaged 
T"i1Several on-going molestations.) 
Earl GIBSON 81-1056 Felony Theft Probation Misd's 
Wednesday, 25 August 1982 
Richard WAKEFIELD 82-365 
Scott HOLLIDAY 82-880 
Kenneth JAMESON 
Ronald ROMERO 
Raymond WATSON 
Jack A. BIL[,S 
82-782 
82-851 
82-982 
82-636 
Thursday, 26 August 1982 
Ronald D. COLLINS 82-162 
Gerald MARX 
Rosalia PINTERI.A 
John R. CASE 
82-653 
82-842 
82-155 
Friday, 27 August 1982 
Felony Theft 
Robbery 
Retail Theft(Misd) 
Att Burglary, 
Concealed Wpn. 
Felony Theft 
felony Theft 
Assault on Police 
Officer (Misd) 
Forcible Sexual 
Abuse 
Veh. Burglary 
forcible Sexual 
Abuse 
Probation Misd's 
Probation, 
serve 30 days 
l yr in SL 
County Jail 
Probation 
Probation 
Ut St Prison felonies 
Probation 
Ut St Prison felonies 
Probation 
Ut St Prison 
James HAGLER 80-971 Felony Theft Probation 
'1onday, 30 August 
Stephanie Ki\LLAS 
R.0dney J. PITT 
P 'u 1 D. HUNT 
'ltfford SHi\RfNER 
'ldr ha 'ALL 
1982 
82-890 
82-919 
82-611 
82-718 
82-981 
Burglary Probation 
Att Burglary Probation 
Att Obtaining a Probation 
Cont Subs by Fraud 
Robbery Probation 
felony Theft Probation 
Felonies 
None 
None 
'Tl1e rnaJority of files contained no information on prior records. 
"11•: .J.:Jf', ll Au(3ust l :J32 
1 ~1 r~f ~~I~ ~~-·371 
"'' II;ci~E S2-}l'J 
11.11/ .;:~ ~Hl;LGTA 62-:175 
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Felony Theft 
Burglary, Theft 
Burglary 
Probation 
Probation 
Probation 
, '" ,,w)'Jr:.o 32-:J6a Burglary, Criminal Probation 
Mischief 
',,e,Jnesday, 1 September 1982 
Jay THOMPSON 32-542 DUI (Misd) 
Setty WISEMAN 82-1022 Issuing Bad Checks 
Dave FOURTNER 82-891 Burglary 
Wesley MOORE 82-637 Att Ag Assault 
Kimberly NANCE 81-1234 Theft 
Thursday, 2 September 1982 
Edward M. PICKETT 82-1017 Felony Theft 
Juanita BROWN 82-1020 Att Forgery 
Tuesday, 7 September 1982 
Leon MITCHELL 82-985 
Tonia THOMPSON 
D::iuglas HAYES 
Robert FRENCH 
(Note: 
82-813 
82-897 
(Note: 
82-594 
Felony Theft 
Out of state theft 
Felony Theft 
Unlawful Dist for 
Value C.S.(2 Cts) 
Marijuana and LSD) 
Possession with 
intent to distr. 
Wednesdaz, 8 se12tember 1982 
Rene SEMRAU 82-42 Theft by Dec pt ion 
Chris HOINVILLE 82-33 Unlawful Dist for 
Value of c.s. 
Sammy MANUMALEUNA 82-825 Burglary 
Jeffery TAYLOR 81-1343 Att Unlawful Dist 
for Value of c.s. 
Philip RUHRER 82-1034 Unlawful Dist for 
Value of c.s. 
James BOGGESS 82-996 Att Burglary 
i\ngel ROMERO 82-387 Felony Theft 
Jteven MAXWELL 82-802 Forcible Sodomy 
60 days 
Probation 
Probation 
Probation 
Probation 
Probation 
Probation 
Ut St Prison 
of automobile) 
Probation 
Ut St Prison 
Probation 
Probation 
Probation 
Probation 
Probation 
Probation 
Probation 
Probation 
Ut St Prison 
Felony 
Misd's 
Misd's 
Misd's 
Misd's 
Misd's 
Misd's 
Felonies 
Felonies 
